August 21, 2024
In early 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia brokedown as it returnedto the earth’s environment. All 7 astronauts on board were eliminated.
This was not the veryfirst NASA objective to end in catastrophe, and it motivated Harvard Business School teacher Amy Edmondson to compose a service case about what went incorrect.
Edmondson researchstudies mental security and organizational knowing. Her most current book is Right Kind of Wrong: The Science of Failing Well.
In this episode, she breaks down the organizational difficulties within NASA that contributed to the Columbia catastrophe, offering a window into the company’s management. Edmondson likewise shares lessons for all leaders about the threats of unyielding hierarchy and of stoppingworking to listen to dissenting voices.
Key episode subjects consistof: management, handling individuals, organizational culture, operations and supply chain management, NASA, hierarchy, science.
HBR On Leadership curates the finest case researchstudies and discussions with the world’s top service and management specialists, to assistance you unlock the finest in those around you. New episodes every week.
- Listen to the initial Cold Call episode: The Space Shuttle Columbia’s Final Mission (2016)
- Find more episodes of Cold Call
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HANNAH BATES: Welcome to HBR On Leadership – case researchstudies and discussions with the world’s top organization and management professionals, hand-selected to assistance you unlock the finest in those around you.
In early 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia brokedown as it returnedto the Earth’s environment. All 7 astronauts on board were eliminated. This was not the veryfirst NASA objective to end in catastrophe. And it motivated Harvard Business School teacher Amy Edmondson to compose a company case about what went incorrect.
Edmondson researchstudies mental security and organizational knowing. Her most current book is Right Kind of Wrong: The Science of Failing Well. In this episode, Edmondson breaks down the organizational obstacles within NASA that contributed to the Columbia disaster, offering a window into the company’s management. Edmondson likewise shares lessons for all leaders about the threats of unyielding hierarchy and of stoppingworking to listen to dissenting voices.
This episode initially aired on Cold Call in September2016 Here it is.
BRIAN KENNY: The Space Shuttle Columbia introduced for the veryfirst time on April 12th, 1981: the veryfirst flight of the Space Shuttle Program. Over the next 22 years, it finished 27 objectives.
On February 1st 2003, as its 28th objective neared an end, the shuttlebus brokedown upon re-entry into the Earth’s environment, killing all 7 team members.
Today we’ll hear from Professor Amy Edmondson about her case, entitled Columbia’s Final Mission. I’m your host, Brian Kenny, and you’re listening to Cold Call.
SPEAKER 1: So, you’re all sitting there in your class.
SPEAKER 2: Professor strolls in, and-
SPEAKER 3: And they appearance up and you understand it’s coming.
SPEAKER 4: Oh, the feared cold call.
BRIAN KENNY: Professor Edmondson teaches in the MBA and doctoral programs here, as well as the executive education program. Her locations of competence consistof management, groups, development and organizational knowing. And possibly you might include rocket science to that list after havingactually composed this case. Amy, welcome.
AMY EDMONDSON: Thank you. Glad to be here.
BRIAN KENNY: So, I idea we would start simply by asking you to set up the case. This opens in a quite remarkable style, due to the nature of the topic.
AMY EDMONDSON: It definitely does. My coworker Mike Roberto came to me right after this awful mishap and stated, “Let’s compose a case on it.”
Now, Mike and I hadactually done anumberof jobs together and we both shared an interest in crisis and failure. So, I stated, “Yes, let’s do it.”
Of course, we had to then wait for about 6 months before the authorities mishap report was done by the Columbia Accident Investigation Team. So, we required those information before we might do our work.
BRIAN KENNY: What influenced you to take on this specific subject?
AMY EDMONDSON: We anticipated that it would be a really abundant story: that the triggers of the mishap would be several, that they would not be easy, that there would be a abundant organizational story behind it. And we were .
And we were especially interested in the truth that NASA had experienced a prior devastating failure in its Shuttle Program back in 1986, with the Challenger launch catastrophe. And so we were interested in whether this was various or the exactsame.
Clearly we anticipated; and we were ideal; that it would not be a simply technical breakdown, that it would be an organizational breakdown. And that’s what we desired to comprehend.
BRIAN KENNY: How is this case various from others in terms of how trainees prepare? I understand you have this paper case, there’s a multimedia variation of this, and you teach it in both methods.
AMY EDMONDSON: Yes. First we composed the paper case. We desired to make sure it stood up to the test of mentor, and it did. We still usage the paper case, particularly often if we’re mentor abroad, and it’s simply mucheasier than the intricacy of the multimedia case.
BRIAN KENNY: .
AMY EDMONDSON: But the multimedia case, it has all of the verysame information and more. And its unique worth is that there are 6 various pointofviews from which it can be checkout. And each trainee is appointed to simply one of them.
The 6 pointofviews, 3 of them are fairly senior supervisors at NASA, and 3 of them are working engineers. They each have gainaccessto to their own e-mails that they had at that time, to the discussions that they were a part of; however of course, not to the discussions that they were not a part of.
So when the trainees come into the class, they each have about 80% of the verysame information as everybody else, which indicates about 20% special information, special just to their function: which is of course, much more like genuine life than an common discussion.
So when I teach the case, I advise individuals of that truth. And I state, “It’s going to be needed for you to ask each other concerns when you hear something that’s perplexing, that you sanctuary’t read previously.”
BRIAN KENNY: Can you talk a little bit about the development of the culture at NASA? Because you go back in some historic information about Apollo objectives, and it appeared like there was a various culture at that time. And it altered over time.
AMY EDMONDSON: All companies, when they’re brand-new, go through a duration of excellent energy and enjoyment and development and openness as they are working to figure out what’s going to work, to fi
